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EDITORIAL |
The terrible events of September 11, 2001, and the bioterrorist-initiated outbreak of anthrax in the weeks immediately following have changed innumerable aspects of our behavior, both individually and collectively. The possible dark side of science, particularly biological science, is now seen only too clearly. The authors, editors, and readers of The Journal of Immunology, with their specialized understanding of prevention, pathogenesis, and defenses against infectious agents, must guard against the possibility that information published in our pages may become a tool in the hands of future bioterrorists. But we must balance any theoretical risk against the potential benefit of the same information in promoting improved understanding of disease prevention, pathogenesis, and host defenses. While balancing that risk and benefit, we must also weigh the further risk that restrictions on publication will reduce or retard the dissemination of important results to the immunology community and the risk that research on prevention and immune responses to certain infectious diseases will not be carried out because of possible restrictions on eventual publication of the results.
This is not an easy dilemma to resolve. How likely is it that we will see information rise through the rigor of our peer review system to be regarded as sufficiently meritorious to warrant publication in The JI, but that is also thought to present a risk of misuse sufficient to justify modification or rejection on that basis alone? I believe it is quite unlikely. For example, a "how to" methods paper that would assist a scientifically unsophisticated terrorist in weaponizing an infectious agent, if ever submitted to The JI, would almost certainly be rejected for lack of scientific interest. On the other hand, it is likely that some individuals who would misuse science also have the scientific expertise to adapt information that might appear in the peer reviewed literature toward nefarious ends. Thus it is necessary for us to address the dilemma—to balance theoretical risks against probable benefits. For example, I have argued that the recent widely-discussed publications in other journals of the increase in virulence associated with insertion of an IL-4 gene into mouse poxvirus and the synthesis of infectious poliovirus from "off the shelf" reagents were of greater importance to the scientific community than their conceivable usefulness to terrorists. Thus, I believe that I would have made the same judgment as did the editors of those journals, and would have favored their publication. On the other hand, such papers do present legitimate concerns and special prepublication scrutiny seems appropriate.
On January 10, 2003, I participated in a meeting of editors and authors to discuss these issues. The results of that meeting have been published as a joint statement of those attending. The conclusions and recommendations were as follows:
"FIRST: The scientific information published in peer-reviewed research journals carries special status, and confers unique responsibilities on editors and authors. We must protect the integrity of the scientific process by publishing manuscripts of high quality, in sufficient detail to permit reproducibility. Without independent verification—a requirement for scientific progress—we can neither advance biomedical research nor provide the knowledge base for building strong biodefense systems.
SECOND: We recognize that the prospect of bioterrorism has raised legitimate concerns about the potential abuse of published information, but also recognize that research in the very same fields will be critical to society in meeting the challenges of defense. We are committed to dealing responsibly and effectively with safety and security issues that may be raised by papers submitted for publication, and to increasing our capacity to identify such issues as they arise.
THIRD: Scientists and their journals should consider the appropriate level and design of processes to accomplish effective review of papers that raise such security issues. Journals in disciplines that have attracted numbers of such papers have already devised procedures that might be employed as models in considering process design.
FOURTH: We recognize that on occasions an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits. Under such circumstances, the paper should be modified, or not be published. Scientific information is also communicated by other means: seminars, meetings, electronic posting, etc. Journals and scientific societies can play an important role in encouraging investigators to communicate results of research in ways that maximize public benefits and minimize risks of misuse."
How might these recommendations be implemented in The Journal of Immunology? We will ask reviewers and editors of papers submitted to The JI to be cognizant of the possibility that information in manuscripts that they are asked to review might be misused. In the event that they believe that this might be so, the paper will be directed to the Editor-in-Chief and the Deputy Editors. Together they will undertake the difficult task of balancing benefit and potential risk, with several possible outcomes: If it is concluded that the benefit-to-risk ratio is favorable, the paper will be published as submitted. Conversely, if the ratio is regarded as unfavorable the authors will be asked to modify specific information that might provide a roadmap for misuse or, conceivably, we will decline to publish the paper.
Will we ever see papers that deserve special scrutiny? I think it is probable that we will. Will we ever see papers that require modification or that we will be unwilling to publish for concerns about potential misuse? Possibly, although I think that is considerably less likely. But I am also convinced of the importance of acknowledging the potential risk and of accepting the responsibility for making those difficult judgments.
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